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STOP SPREADING THE DATA
PSM, Trust, and Third-Party Services
Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Hilde Van den Bulck, and Sokol Kosta 
ABSTRACT
The article analyzes problems relating to public service media use of third-party 
services that track, collect, and analyze user behavior. The article extends a rights-
based conception of privacy to privacy as a social phenomenon based in trust, 
relevant to public service media as “islands of trust.” However, data of European 
public and private media sites show that public service media, especially those 
that run advertising, show few differences with private media in their use of third-
party services. The European Union’s (EU’s) General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) did significantly change this, suggesting a need for public service media 
to prioritize ethical values over market considerations.
Keywords: third-party web services, trackers, rights-based approach, information 
privacy, trust, public service media, private media 
Expanding on a rights-based approach, we analyze problems relating 
to legacy, in particular public service, media use of third-party services 
that track, collect, and analyze user behavior through the lens of  privacy- 
as-trust. Theoretically, the article extends a rights-based conception of 
information privacy to a conception of privacy as a social phenomenon 
based in trust and how this is particularly relevant for public service media 
as “islands of trust” in an era of datafication and surveillance. However, 
empirical data of a sample of European public and private media sites 
show that public service media, especially those allowed to run adver-
tising, show limited differences with private media in their use of third-
party services. The observation that European Union’s (EU’s) General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as a legal instrument has not had 
a significant impact on the number of third-party services suggests some 
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limitations when thinking of privacy from a purely legal perspective on 
communication rights and helps to emphasize the need for public service 
media as duty-bearers to prioritize ethical values, in particular trust, over 
market considerations to maintain their trusted relationship with citizens.
This contribution expands on a rights-based approach to information pri-
vacy and autonomy through the concept of privacy-as-trust and its relation-
ship to users’ (rights holders’) trust in (public service) media (duty-bearers). 
This serves as a framework to analyze the use of third-party services—
that, potentially, track, collect, and analyze user behavior1—in a sample of 
European public and private media. We analyze and discuss longitudinal 
data from a wide-ranging sample of European public service media (hereaf-
ter: PSM) and private media. Findings are used to discuss how respect for 
citizens’ trust, more than a legal obligation, needs to be at the heart of a pri-
vacy policy of PSM to ensure their continued position as trusted institutions.
The exponential growth of web-based media services, such as social 
media, as well as the logic of optimizing audience for user loyalty and 
advertising efficiency nudge legacy media, like newspapers and broadcast-
ers, to implement new technologies. Technological innovations provide 
legacy media with new opportunities for content creation and dissemi-
nation and for audience relations. For instance, to help their Internet-
based content reach increasingly diversified audiences, media track users’ 
behavior, often in collaboration with outside web services. So, when a user 
loads a webpage, a number of external services are contacted, triggered by 
embedded scripts and cookies. These third parties can perform a range 
of services: some deliver or help distribute audio/video streaming; others 
provide technical resources like computer code to build webpages, or help 
editors, marketing people, media researchers, and managers to analyze user 
behavior; other third parties show content from social media or advertis-
ing. As such, legacy media have become part of a datafication process in 
which online human action (clicks, likes . . .) is tracked and translated into 
quantified and quantifiable “big data.”22 We focus on third-party servers 
that track, collect, and analyze user behavior to report site activity to edi-
tors or to optimize exposure to content and advertising.
These audience data are not just functional but also tradable and, thus, 
a potential source of revenue that can counter legacy media’s loss of adver-
tising.33 However, they come with a set of legal and ethical issues relating 
 1. Roesner, Kohno, and Wetherall.
 2. Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier; Van Dijck.
 3. For example, Donders et al.; Raats, Evens, and Pauwels.
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to infringement of citizens’ rights, leading to discussions about privacy 
and surveillance.4 This concerns all media but especially PSM, given their 
role and position as trusted institutions.5 Law and policymakers try to deal 
with these issues from their end. The most formidable reaction to date has 
been the EU’s legal framework: the so-called GDPR.6 In force since May 
25, 2019, the GDPR aims to give users more control over the collection 
and distribution of their personal information. The main aim of this article 
is not the evaluation of (the impact of ) the GDPR. However, we analyze 
long-term data to answer the research questions: Since the introduction of 
the GDPR, do audiences from legacy media, especially PSM, meet fewer third-
party servers when accessing their digital offerings than before GDPR and does 
this differ between media that can/do and can/do not carry advertising?
The principle goal of this contribution, however, is to understand whether 
the role of PSM as trusted institutions impacts their use of trackers, that is, 
if the values associated with PSM have an impact on the technical solutions 
they employ in their daily operations. Since tracking and data mining can 
occur without users’ knowledge, infringing their privacy is a real threat and 
legacy media’s respect for their audience’s privacy becomes a crucial ethical 
issue, beyond user consent. We argue that respect for privacy and disclosure 
revolves around trust, following Waldman’s7 notion of privacy-as-trust: trust 
as a social phenomenon where the rights holders (users) trust the duty-bear-
ers (media) to do the right thing after consenting to let them use their data. 
This is of particular relevance to PSM as their brand identity and reputa-
tion—and, thus, their public financing—are based in their role and posi-
tion as trusted institutions. For interactive digital platforms, the burden of 
demonstrating integrity and independence falls back on the media organiza-
tions, in terms of ensuring that their users and their browsing behavior can-
not be identified by external, third-party services. Especially in the context 
of exploitation of these data for commercial revenue, the question is whether 
PSM more than private legacy media are vigilant in their use of third-party 
services, whether this differs depending on whether they can/do carry advertising 
and whether GDPR has worked as a wake-up call in this regard.
 4. Srnicek; Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.
 5. In full: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 
27, 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
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To study these questions, after this introduction, we develop a theoret-
ical framework that starts from a rights-based approach and combines the 
complementary theoretical perspectives of media values, media and infor-
mation law, and policy and computer ethics to understand privacy-as-trust 
in relationship to PSM as “islands of trust” in a context of datafication 
and, ultimately, surveillance capitalism.
This theoretical framework serves as a background to our data analysis. 
Data were collected through extensive and repeated tracking of third-party 
activity on media-related websites. From a dataset of +61.5 million record-
ings of HTTP responses for +12,000 web pages from 1,291 websites visited 44 
times spanning before and after the commencement of GDPR (nine times 
before May 25, 2018), we selected 342 media websites from 39 European 
countries (#107 from European Broadcasting Union [EBU] members, #235 
from private media). Data were analyzed and third-party servers identi-
fied and categorized into 16 categories, including Advertising, Analytics, 
Distribution technologies, and Malicious servers (see method section).
The result section looks at various characteristics of third-party services 
before focusing on differences between private and public media, changes 
over time, especially before and after GDPR, and country specific dif-
ferences. These results are discussed in light of the ethical implications 
of what may legally be a licensed use of audiences’ data by third-party 
services. We assumed that the more third-party servers involved in a web-
page visit, (1) the higher the potential exposure of personal, identifiable 
information and, thus, (2) the more the ethical aspects of privacy and, ulti-
mately (3) the value of trust—crucial to the working of media, especially 
PSM—are compromised. Finally, we evaluate whether and how, in an area 
of individual rights infringement, media policies that work from a rights-
based approach should move beyond legal instruments such as GDPR to 
an understanding of privacy-as-trust.
Theoretical Framework: Communication Rights,  
Privacy-as-Trust, and PSM
A Rights-Based Approach and Privacy: From the Legal . . .
This contribution builds a framework for analysis of third-party services 
by European legacy media, especially PSM, through an expanded rights-
based perspective. Such a framework takes Human Rights as a guiding 
principle and aims to identify rights-holders and duty-bearers as it “seeks 
This content downloaded from 
             85.191.184.80 on Fri, 15 Jan 2021 09:13:15 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
478        JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY
JIP 10_15_Van_den_Bulck.indd Page 478 09/12/20  2:53 PM
to strengthen the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims and of 
duty-bearers to satisfy those claims.”8 In policymaking regarding third-
party service data transfer, this perspective requires policy initiatives to 
start from the communication rights of media users (the rights holders) 
and to ensure the responsibilities of the media companies (the duty-bear-
ers) in realizing those rights with a policy aim to help redress the disturbed 
balance between the two parties involved.
Among the key communication rights, identified by Nieminen,9 are 
privacy and citizens’ autonomy in deciding what happens to their personal 
data, next to access, availability, competence, and dialogue. In the context 
of third-party services, privacy certainly has received considerable atten-
tion from law and policymakers, looking to protect personal data and pri-
vacy in general and to enforce duty-bearers’ responsibilities. National law 
and policymakers, however, are hampered in their response because of the 
dominance of neo-liberal and free speech paradigms,10 difficulties in grasp-
ing the technologically complex details involved11 and, most of all, limited 
options to tackle global companies that escape national control.12 As such, 
national policymakers have struggled to address structural causes and bar-
riers to citizens fully performing their communication right to privacy and 
autonomy.13 Instead, as part of its wider policy attention to citizen’s privacy, 
the EU has taken the lead, defining requirements for providers of interac-
tive services regarding personal data protection and obtaining user consent 
about data collection.14 Especially the EU’s GDPR, in force since May 25, 
2018, provides extended rights to users to protect personal information, 
including the right to be informed about the processing of personal data, 
and the right-to-be-forgotten, that is, have all personal data removed from 
the provider’s records.
. . . to the Ethical
However, collecting user data involves more fundamental ethical questions 
as data collection can be lawful but at odds with ethical principles of good 
 8. Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall.
 9. Nieminen.
 10. Van Dijck.
 11. Van den Bulck et al.
 12. Vaidhyanathan.
 13. Boesen and Martin.
 14. EU Parliament; European Commission.
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behavior toward end users, that is, rights holders. According to Shoshana 
Zuboff,15 tech companies are the nodal points of surveillance capitalism 
that exploits human behavior (user data) as raw material and refines it into 
prediction products that can be sold to interested parties including adver-
tisers. To get more data, more precise data, and more heterogenous data, 
surveillance capitalism actively stimulates users to produce more data via 
different types of devices and sensors. To individual users, this may not feel 
as a big threat as they conveniently use the platforms’ services. For Zuboff, 
privacy is not so much eroded as it is redistributed. A user’s right to decide 
over their privacy, for example, via privacy policies, has been transferred 
to the locus of surveillance capitalism. If you want to use the service, you 
must accept terms and conditions. Thus, the problem is not the viola-
tion of individual users’ specific privacy but the ethics of those who hold 
“instrumentarian power” (21–41).
A key question concerns who exactly is expected to be ethical: Is it 
restricted to third-party services or does it extend to the media that use 
them? Recent discussions revolve around the ethical role of tech and social 
media giants such as Facebook. A good illustration is the 2019 Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) fine of $5 billion for Facebook’s violation of 
various privacy rules. The highest fine in FTC’s history, the number is 
dwarfed by Facebook’s $15 billion revenue in the Spring quarter of 2019 and 
its $22 billion profit in 2018. In a cynical turn of events, the fine resulted in 
Facebook’s stock prices going up.16 This relative inability and often reluc-
tance to regulate and curb tech and social media giants, has resulted in 
law and policymakers appealing to these companies’ ethical awareness. As 
Wagner17 suggests, though, in this context, “ethics” is the new “industry 
self-regulation” (1) with government regulation considered as part of the 
problem rather than the solution and tech and social media giants turning 
to ethics as a catch-all phrase and a means to be seen to be doing it.
Far less discussed is the ethical behavior of legacy media, both private 
and PSM. We focus on PSM that have a history of being called upon to 
act ethically as so-called “islands of trust.” This has two complementary 
theoretical perspectives—PSM values and computer ethics—that come 
together in Waldman’s18 notion of privacy-as-trust.
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Trust in Media and the PSM Conundrum
While ethics in relationship to PSM covers many issues, it crucially revolves 
around the notion of PSM as trusted institutions.19 “Trust” can be under-
stood as “the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a 
trustee based on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular 
action, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”20: 
that is, PSM as a place of trust, a space that people turn to assuming it has 
their best interests at heart. Indeed, in return for public funding and a con-
tinued position in a competitive market, governments stipulate and soci-
eties expect a commitment to ensure universality, contribute to identity 
and social cohesion, and provide a mix of information, inspiration, and 
entertainment, while maintaining high standards of quality, decency, and 
objectivity, resulting in high levels of trustworthiness.21 Trust was always an 
intrinsic but implicit value for PSM. From the 1990s onward, it became 
an explicit topic in discussions regarding the legitimacy and relevance of 
PSM institutions amid fierce commercial competition and “hostile” gov-
ernment scrutiny. This coincided with people’s trust in legacy media in 
general showing a slow but steady decline22 to the point where it can no 
longer be taken for granted. This results from a range of trends includ-
ing tabloidization, personalization, and developments such as the upsurge 
in dis- and misinformation.23 Infringement of the communication right 
to privacy and disrespect for the autonomy of users in decision-making 
regarding the use of their personal data can further undermine this trust.
In an increasingly commercial and self-serving ecosystem, PSM, so far, 
have stood out as “islands of trust,” a descriptor coined by the Digital 
Strategy Group24 of the EBU’s.25 Biltereyst26 calls it the “aura of trust” that 
“includes a feeling of quality, reliability, honesty, competence and good 
intentions” (341). Research confirms that in countries with strong PSM, 
trust in radio and television broadcasting is stronger.27
 19. Curran; Carey.
 20. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman.
 21. Van den Bulck; Born and Prosser.
 22. Hanitzsch, Van Dalen, and Steindl; For example, Jones; Stoll.
 23. McChesney and Nichols; Allcott and Gentzkow; Tsfati and Ariely.
 24. EBU Digital Strategy Group.
 25. PSM institutions representative and lobby organization; Bardoel and d’Haenens.
 26. Biltereyst.
 27. EBU Media Intelligence Service; EBU.
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However, neither conceptual thinking nor empirical measuring of trust 
in relationship to PSM relates to the issues at hand as they are rooted in 
predigital standards regarding content and conduct, rather than to privacy 
problems that result from the datafication of legacy media. To remain rel-
evant,2828 PSM institutions have a vested interest (and most often a man-
date) to keep up with and invest in digital developments, including the 
use of third-party services, be it within the confines of legal frameworks 
such as the GDPR. However, for PSM institutions to do so in a way that 
it does not undermine their unique position as trusted institutions and 
that they remain loyal to their core values,29 they must think beyond their 
traditional understanding of trust as well as the confines of a purely legal 
approach. This is especially the case for PSM that are allowed to generate 
part of the revenue from commercial sources, given the abovementioned 
trade in data.
Privacy-as-Trust
Where “trust” in the context of PSM traditionally refers to quality standards 
in content and conduct, in computer science and computer engineering 
literature, trust typically is discussed along with “security” and “privacy”: 
Trust is seen as prerequisite for security in personal data exchange between 
system components or systems: Can the receiving subsystem be trusted? 
Can the received data be trusted? Trust is a matter of formalized software 
design procedures and structures—trust models.30 In an early contribution 
to computer engineering, Denning31 defines trust as “an assessment that 
a person, organization, or object can be counted on to perform accord-
ing to a given set of standards” (37). It is not an inherent property of a 
system (or person, or organization) but a contextual assessment made by 
an observer, always subject to reassessment. Denning believes that market 
forces, over time, will ensure the provision of trusted software solutions, 
as “the value of a person, organization, or object in the market will be 
determined to a large part by the amount of trust that others have in them” 
(38). Furthermore, trust is gained over time, not by formal certificates: “If 
a software product shows no evidence of containing malicious code after 
 28. Bardoel and Lowe.
 29. Van den Bulck Hilde and Moe; Just and Latzer.
 30. Chokhani.
 31. Denning.
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several years of use, then it will be trusted to be non-malicious regardless 
of whether that property was formally proved” (38). More recently, the 
field has developed different types of “trust models,”32 including a so-called 
“zero trust model.”33
Computer science’s instrumental understanding of trust shows its 
importance to secure system operations and confidentiality of the data pro-
cessed. In relationship to PSM organizations, this conception needs to be 
extended to a human relation between a user and the service provider (i.e., 
PSM). Waldman,34 working from a legal perspective, incorporates this in 
his concept of privacy-as-trust. For him, “[privacy] is, at its core, about the 
social relationships governing disclosure between and among individuals 
and between users and the platforms that collect, analyze and manipulate 
their information for some purpose” (3). He argues that this goes beyond 
the “notice and choice” approach (8) that is typical of consent buttons as 
“it gives users little to no help when making disclosure decisions, and it 
offers even less protection when Internet companies use our data in unex-
pected and invasive ways” (8), especially in a context of algorithms and 
Artificial Intelligence. Because rights holders share when they trust, it is 
important to consider information privacy as a social norm based in trust: 
they expect “disclosure to occur in safe environments buttressed by con-
current norms of confidentiality and discretion” (8). Consistent breaches 
of confidentiality and discretion undermine users’ trust in the institution. 
For PSM institutions, respecting privacy of its users’ data beyond notice 
and choice becomes a matter of “protecting relationships of trust” (88), 
also in their collaboration with third parties involved in data collection 
and handling.
Research into Third-Party Servers
The activity of third-party servers has caught the interest of privacy-con-
cerned researchers, typically working from a quantitative—technical 
research perspective.35 Some authors36 focus on the technologies that iden-
tify users in the browser from one website visit to the next, either through 
 32. Yan.
 33. Ahmed et al.; Tao, Lei, and Ruxiang; Gilman and Barth.
 34. Waldman.
 35. Urban et al., “Towards Understanding Privacy Implications.”
 36. Falahrastegar et al.; Wambach and Bräunlich.
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“cookies”37 or through so-called “finger-printing” technologies that iden-
tify users across devices without cookies.38 Other studies map and catego-
rize which third-party sites are contacted when users visit webpages. For 
instance, using automatic scripts, Englehardt and Narayanan39 analyzed 
the one million most popular websites in the world in 2016. Visiting the 
pages 90 million times in one month, they found 81.000 different third-
party URLs, yet only 123 were present at more than 1 percent of the web-
sites indicating a “long tail” distribution of third-party URLs. Their study 
further showed that news websites have the highest average number of 
third-party URLs, while government, nonprofit and university organi-
zations’ websites have the lowest number. Urban et al.40 show that the 
sharing of data in advertising networks declined at the start of the GDPR 
but afterward showed a slight rebound. The amount of tracking was not 
affected. Before that, Urban et al.41 found that the GDPR appeared to have 
an effect on the illegal but wide-spread praxis of “cookie synchronization” 
whereby uses can be identified across websites and be subject to “re-target-
ing” advertising, that is, advertising that reminds you of your browsing his-
tory. Urban et al.42 further investigated the tracking capabilities and related 
privacy implications of adware. Analyzing developments in third party 
presence in the period February to September 2018 for eleven types of web-
sites published either by private or public organizations, the authors43 find 
large differences among the different categories of websites. A study44 com-
paring unique URLs found on PSM and commercial broadcast media’s 
web pages during six visits between December 2016 and August 2017, that 
is, before the GDPR, showed an average of 42.95 third-party URLs among 
private media compared to 70.42 for PSM with advertisements, 37.60 for 
PSM with possibility for advertisements, and 17.33 for PSM not allowed 
to display commercial advertisements. While low numbers of third-party 
URLs for PSM could be related to a ban on commercial advertisements, 
private media, too, showed considerable variation with a span between 
eight and 88 unique third-party servers. The current study wants to find 
 37. Internet Engineering Task Force.
 38. Acar et al.
 39. Englehardt and Narayanan.
 40. Urban et al., “Measuring the Impact of the GDPR on Data Sharing.”
 41. Urban et al., “The Unwanted Sharing Economy.”
 42. Urban et al., “Towards Understanding Privacy Implications.”
 43. Sørensen and Kosta.
 44. Sørensen and Van den Bulck.
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out (1) if these comparisons between private and public service broadcast 
media hold and (2) whether the GDPR has affected the presence of third-
party servers.
Other studies have focused on understanding the ownership and type of 
these third-party servers and the media’s dependence on these. Lindskow45 
mapped the business network of 41 US media publishers and finds 1,356 
business partners involved in building web pages for users, concluding 
that traditional news media webpage production involves a huge network 
of interacting companies. Sjøvaag et al.’s46 analysis of the use of third-party 
services by news apps of legacy media suggests a divergent yet wide range 
of services as well as an increase in extent and complexity of the network 
over time but also shows that behind this wide variety of services are a 
smaller group of dominant players, such as Alphabet.
Methodological Set-Up
Data Collection, Cleaning, and Analysis
We sampled websites from two categories: websites published by PSM 
organizations and by legacy private mass media, for example, newspapers 
and commercial broadcasters. As a working definition for PSM, we use the 
criterion of membership of the EBU,47 while the selection of private media 
sites was based on Reuter’s Institute Digital News Report 2017.48 For the 
22 European countries featured in the Digital News Report, we selected 
the top five most popular news sites in terms of percentage weekly, for the 
remaining 17 countries, we used Alexa web service, selecting top news sites 
for the specific countries.49 This way we found 235 private media sites and 
107 websites from EBU members. Using data provided by the EBU on the 
advertising status for EBU members, as well as our own investigations, we 
further categorize sites from EBU members in three groups, reflective of 
their relationship to commercial advertising: 56 EBU member sites allow 
or feature advertising while it is forbidden at 38 websites. For 13 EBU mem-
ber websites, the situation is unclear; in the following, they are labeled 
 45. Lindskow.
 46. Sjøvaag et al.
 47. https://www.ebu.ch/about/members.
 48. Newman et al.
 49. https://www.alexa.com.
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“Advertising not seen.” We assume that all private media in our sample 
are allowed by national or EU regulation to have commercial advertising.
To simulate a user’s browsing behavior, we visited from an IP-address 
in the EU 10 web pages from each website. To ensure comparability across 
the sample dates, we visited the same set of webpages throughout the entire 
sampling period. The sampling period spans 20 months from February 
2018 to October 2019 and counts 44 visits/sampling dates, nine of which 
took place before the commencement of GDPR on May 25, 2018.
Visiting the pages was by means of an automated procedure that simu-
lates human browsing behavior. On a virtual machine placed within the EU, 
we used an open-source python/selenium script50 to load the webpages in 
our browser (Mozilla Firefox), to scroll it and to record all HTTP-request, 
-responses, and -redirects. In this way, we recorded all interactions a user’s 
browser has with third-party servers (hereafter: “TPs”) as well as with the 
server of the media website being visited (the “first-party server”). All web 
pages were accessed from the same browser and the IP-address from the 
EU. The cookies set during browsing were preserved between each visit. The 
browser had no other cookies or other user-profile information that would 
advance the identification of the user and his interests for example, for the 
sale of advertising, re-targeting and the like. The browser never made a login 
to any social media or Google, thus representing a disinterested user with no 
shopping behavior and no social media activities. In all cases, the browser 
ignored “GDPR Consent” dialogue boxes; our findings thus represent an 
ignorant, passive user that does not explicitly allows transfer of person data 
or interaction with TP servers, a procedure that the EU High Court has 
ruled illegal October 2019 in the so-called Planet 49 case.51 Here the Court 
ruled that an active consent—for example, via a click in “check-box”—must 
be given by the user. Assuming that the user consents to a site’s privacy poli-
cies by the continued visiting of the website does not provide sufficient legal 
basis for fulfilment of the GDPR. In this sense, all visited websites included 
in our sample violated the GDPR as they reacted to our requests.
We based our analysis on the recording of all successful HTTP responses 
(status = 200) from the TP servers’ URLs. From the total set of HTTP 
 50. We use the OpenWPM framework developed by Steven Englehardt and Arvind 
Narayanan, published as open source at https://github.com/citp/OpenWPM. See also: 
Englehardt and Narayanan.
 51. EU Court case C-673/17. Accessed February 2, 2020. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/docu-
ment/document.jsf?text=&docid=218462&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&oc-
c=first&part=1&cid=1447493.
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responses (+50 million for our 44 visits), we identified for each visited site, 
the unique top-level TPs that appeared during the browsing of the 10 pages 
from the visited site. Subsequently, we categorized the TPs to identify the 
possible purpose of the TPs’ interaction with the browser, as well as the 
company hosting the TPs. Using various methods of identification and cat-
egorization, we first entered the TP URL into a browser. In cases where we 
obtained a readable page, we analyzed this manually to look for keywords 
indicating the overall purpose of the TPs, for example, a real-time bidding 
platform for the sale of online advertising or a content delivery network. 
In cases where the browser showed an HTTP error message (e.g., 404 page 
not found, 403 forbidden, or 500 Internal Server Error) or where content 
appear to be “fake,” we checked whether the TPs URL was listed at www.
threatcrowd.org as a site suspected of malicious behavior. If that was not 
the case, the TPs was labeled unidentifiable. The total number of found 
TPs exceed 3,500 URLs, so we have not yet been able to identify all TPs.
Categorization was based on a system developed by the authors and 
validated in a previous study.52 The category Advertising covers tracking, 
sell-side and demand-side servers, real-time bidding, user profiling, adver-
tisement agencies, and Data Management Platforms. Analytics covers 
performance, user profiling, and monitoring. Content contains web page 
elements (not advertising) from TPs, for example, syndicated news stories, 
embedded YouTube-videos. Cybersecurity covers anti-ad-fraud and services 
to protect websites. Distribution technology covers content delivery networks 
and video streaming. Editorial covers tools for publishers. The Malicious 
category consists of TPs listed as such at the cybersecurity community 
www.threatcrowd.org. The Plug-in category covers services embedded at 
the visited pages, such as blogs. Privacy TP URLs cover cookie consent 
services and similar. Programming covers libraries and fonts used to render 
the page. Publisher are TPs owned by media organizations. Retail are TPs 
from product brands and services websites. The Search engine category as 
well as the Social media contains services with these specific purposes.
Methodological Caveats
The collection, processing, and interpretation of data on TP presence 
involves a number of steps and decisions that can influence the result. First, 
the dataset is “created” not “observed,” as it records automated nonhuman 
 52. This categorization builds on Sørensen and Kosta.
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visits to websites conducted by a “user” (a script on a virtual machine). 
This means the absence of human browsing behavior; the script has no 
shopping habits, no credit card, smart phone, smart TV, or social media 
account. In short our “user” provides no extra “data signals” to advertisers 
and other TP providers.53 One implication of the absence of real user data 
signals could be a more complicated online bidding process for the pro-
grammatic advertising as the lack of user information may make it more 
difficult to find a buyer for the advertising space “inventory.”54 However, 
due to the nature of a bidding process, the outcome differs each time an ad 
should be sold. This influences also the involvement of TP services in the 
bidding. The size of our dataset provides us however with “safety in num-
bers” that emphasizes the significant patterns in TP appearances.
Second, the processing of the collected data offers similar problems. 
For one, the number of different TP URLs must be interpreted with care. 
The same TP company can be present through several server names, which 
can account for unidentifiable and technical TP servers. Furthermore, 
Englehardt and Narayanan55 and Lindskow56 show that the number of 
new TP servers decrease with additional visits. So, while we made sure 
to visit the sites repeatedly both before and after the GDPR, results are 
still influenced by the number of iterations. Furthermore, not all TPs are 
equally harmful in respect to the potential privacy violation caused by the 
collected data. A network of many TP services—for example, provided 
by Google—may better utilize collected data than a single TP service that 
does not exchange data with other services.
Third, our analysis shows that many TP servers are programmatic, 
that is, triggered by embedded scripts that depend on a user’s browser 
history (cookies), device history (fingerprinting), location (geo-location), 
match with existing user-profile data; for example, from social networks, 
or wrapped scripts in scripts. Finally, our analysis is based on HTTP 
responses, that is, the data actually delivered to the user’s computer. 
Another approach would be to analyze HTTP requests and HTTP redi-
rects that would provide information about what the TPs ideally wanted 
in terms of data. With these technical details in mind, let us turn to the 
main results and how to interpret them in light of the research questions 
and theoretical framework.
 53. Acar et al.
 54. Busch.
 55. Englehardt and Narayanan.
 56. Lindskow.
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Results
General Findings
In 44 visits to the 342 media websites, we found 3,511 unique TPs. At the 235 
private media sites, we found the highest number of unique TPs, namely 
3,213. At the 56 PSM sites that allow advertising, we found 802 unique TPs. 
For the 13 PSM sites where we did not see advertising, we found 255 unique 
TPs. Finally, at the 38 PSM sites where advertising is forbidden, we found 
224 unique TPs (see Table 1). Some sites have many TPs, others very few, 
indicating considerable differences within the categories of media sites (see 
also Figures 10–12).
A few TPs are present many times at many sites, but most TPs only 
appear a few times and/or on few sites, corresponding to a so-called “long 
tail” (see Figure 1). The “tail” is shortest and steepest for PSM sites where 
advertising is forbidden, longest for PSM media with advertising and for 
private media. The advertising at media sites thus seems to have an impact 
on the number of unique TPs a user will meet.
As Table 2 shows, advertising-related TPs represent the largest group, 
after the category of yet unidentified TPs. Almost all sites (98.83 percent) 
have Analytics TPs and a large majority (93.48 percent) has Advertising 
TPs. Many sites also use TPs for Distribution (89.77 percent) and 
Programming (89.47 percent), as well as Search Engines (86.55 percent), 
and Social Media (84.21 percent). However, privacy-related TPs are found 
at less than half (41.81 percent) of all sites, while malicious TPs occurred at 
almost one third of sites (32.16 percent).
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figure 1 The long tails of TPs for different types of media.
table 2 Distribution of TPs in Categories, All Media

















of Sites  
(n = 342) 
(%)
Advertising 934 548 183,304 196.26 93.86
Analytics 131 77 49,822 380.32 98.83
Content 160 62 11,201 70.01 62.87
Cybersecurity 7 5 168 24.00 4.39
Distribution 
technology
187 94 38,532 206.05 89.77
Editorial 25 22 11,025 441.00 55.56
Malicious 42 13 2,293 54.60 32.16
Plug-in 29 25 3,362 115.93 35.96
Privacy 6 4 1,594 265.67 41.81
Programming 68 43 20,167 2,96.57 89.47
Publisher 253 73 13,963 55.19 52.92
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of Sites  
(n = 342) 
(%)
Retail 95 43 3,180 33.47 46.78
Search engine 13 5 23,187 1,783.62 86.55
Social media 21 9 32,793 1,561.57 84.21
Unidentifiable 252 105 15,169 60.19 74.56
Unidentified 1,288 134 18,237 14.16 80.99
Comparing the number of unique TPs for each category to their total 
number of appearances, as presented in Table 3, reveals a high concentra-
tion of a limited number of TPs from just a few major companies in the 
categories of Search Engine and Social Media, while the advertising TPs, 
on average, have fewer appearances per TPs and originate from a wider 
range of companies. However, a more detailed look at the 548 Advertising-
related TP companies shows a long tail headed by the dominant top 20 TP 
companies that account for 51.79 percent of all appearances, with a clear 
lead for Google. Importantly, though, the top has a number of company 
names less known by the general public, such as Criteo, RocketFuel, and 
AppNexus.
table 3 Top-20 of Advertising-Related TP Companies
TP Advertising Company No. of Appearances Percent of All Appearances 
(n = 183304) (%)
Google 42,952 23.43





Rubicon Project 4,333 2.36
AOL 3,013 1.64
Smartadserver 2,705 1.48
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Table 4 shows each TP company’s total percentage share of TP-appearances 
as it looks for private media sites and for the three types of PSM sites. The 
table is presented as a combined top 20 sorted descending after private 
media, then after EBU member with ads, then after EBU member no ads 
seen, and finally after EBU member ads forbidden. TP companies that are 
not among the top 20 for the specific type of media are marked in italics 
text. Percentage share is calculated for TPs from each TP company of all 
recorded unique TPs per site and visit (all visits aggregated).
For three types of media sites, namely private media and PSM media 
with advertising, TPs from Google had the biggest share of all TPs interac-
tions in terms of unique TPs per site per visit.
Google’s Dominance
Google TPs are more present at PSM sites with advertising than on private 
media site and PSM sites where advertising is not allowed. The share of all 
TP interactions for Google TPs varies between 14.7 percent (PSM—ads 
forbidden) and 27.9 percent (PSM—ads allowed), while Private Media 
have fewer unique interactions with Google TPs (21.5 percent). The large 
share can be attributed to Google’s 32 different TPs. In Table 5, we pres-
ent the Google TPs, their purposes and presence at media sites.57 Google’s 
 57. Private Media = 32 different TPs, EBU members with ads = 22 different TPs, EBU mem-
bers advertising not seen = 14 different TPs, EBU members advertising forbidden = 15 different 
TPs.
TP Advertising Company No. of Appearances Percent of All Appearances 
(n = 183304) (%)
OpenX 1,798 0.98





Global Video Ads Group 1,506 0.82
AddThis 1,490 0.81
Total all identified 
companies
23,091 51.79
table 3 Top-20 of Advertising-Related TP Companies (Continued )
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table 4 Top-20 of TP Companies for Four Types of Media Sites. Sorted After  
Private Media
TP Company Private Media
(n = 235) (%)
PSM Ads 
Allowed
(n = 56) (%)
PSM No Ads 
Seen
(n = 13) (%)
PSM Ads 
Forbidden
(n = 38) (%)














Facebook 4.93 6.29 5.74 4.55
Amazon 2.16 1.21 1.16 1.95
Twitter 2.10 2.71 3.62 3.60
Criteo 1.85 0.94 0.08 -
Chartbeat 1.54 1.36 0.90 3.60
Comscore 1.50 1.87 1.17 2.91
RocketFuel 1.41 1.13 0.92 -
AppNexus 1.31 0.75 0.14 -
Adform 1.22 0.67 0.30 0.03
Rubicon Project 1.09 0.83 0.34 -
Gemius 0.93 1.81 0.62 0.98
AOL 0.89 0.40 0.25 -
CloudFlare 0.74 0.90 1.00 0.89
JW Player 0.73 1.42 0.80 1.09
Smartadserver 0.69 0.41 - 0.11
AddThis 0.65 0.37 0.32 0.61
Moat 0.56 0.24 0.28 -
New Relic 0.55 2.32 2.31 1.48
NPO - 1.99 2.14 -
Longtail Ad 
Solutions
0.48 1.19 0.63 0.56
Hotjar 0.55 1.17 - 0.70
AT Internet 0.13 1.01 2.33 6.37
Akamai 
Technologies
0.51 0.82 1.45 3.21
Cedexis 0.13 0.34 2.72 0.15
France 
Televisions
- 0.26 2.48 -
Microsoft 0.18 0.17 1.34 0.77
(Continued )
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TP Company Private Media
(n = 235) (%)
PSM Ads 
Allowed
(n = 56) (%)
PSM No Ads 
Seen
(n = 13) (%)
PSM Ads 
Forbidden
(n = 38) (%)
Tealium 0.18 0.17 1.24 -
BootstrapCDN 0.30 0.68 1.24 0.06
jQuery 0.32 0.57 1.24 0.31
Qbrick 0.20 0.51 1.10 1.05
Nielsen 0.25 0.37 0.18 1.37
ReadSpeaker 
Holding
0.003 0.09 - 1.18
InSkin Media 0.04 0.28 - 0.92
Demdex 0.27 0.42 0.72 0.69
table 4 Top-20 of TP Companies for Four Types of Media Sites. Sorted After  
Private Media (Continued )
advertising service doubleclick.net was present at 225 out of 235 Private 
Media sites (= 95.74 percent), at 47 out of 56 PSM—ads allowed sites (83.93 
percent), and at 11 out of 13 PSM—no ads seen (84.62 percent). Perhaps 
more interesting: doubleclick.net was found at seven out of 38 PSM ads 
forbidden sites. For google-analytics.com, a similar picture emerges, except 
that its share on PSM—ads forbidden’ sites was higher (12 out of 38 sites, 
31.58 percent).
Although Table 4 suggests Google’s dominance, this must be qualified. 
Google dominated in three of four cases, but second in the ranking was 
a heterogenous group of TPs for which we could not identify the com-
pany behind. The long tail of TPs contributed with many interactions. For 
Private Media, 53 percent of all interactions were from TPs not in the top 
20 while for PSM—ads allowed sites this was 42 percent; for PSM—ads 
not seen it was 39 percent; and for PSM—ads forbidden it amounted to 45 
percent, suggesting a more differentiated picture. Analyzing the long tail 
for the 83 TPs without company info for PSM—ads forbidden, to a high 
degree they appear on German PSMs in the ARD group that are exchang-
ing data with each other. In short, Google is important but definitely not 
the only important TP provider.
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Developments Over 20 Months
Our overall sample spans a period of 20 months. Over this period, there was 
a significant decline in the average number of unique TPs per site for private 
media, concurrent with the enforcement of the GDPR in May 2018. For PSM 
sites, however, no significant decline is observed. The average number of unique 
TPs for PSM sites fluctuates over time but with no significant pattern except 
for a peak March 12, 2019, resulting from measurement problems (Figure 2).
The percentage distribution of TPs in different categories shows no 
dramatic changes over time, neither for Private Media (Figure 3) nor for 
PSM sites (Figures 4–6). Private Media and PSM sites with advertising 
allowed have a higher share of Advertising TPs than the two other types of 
PSM sites. The slightly growing number of unidentified TPs illustrates the 
dynamic nature of this kind of empirical research.
The relatively stable distribution of TPs categories can be compared 
to the growth in Google-related TPs. Figure 7 shows that the TPs from 
Google over the 20 months gain a bigger share of the total number of TPs 
interactions. Together, these data indicate that smaller TPs lose share to 
Google TPs. The biggest growth can be seen for PSM sites with advertis-
ing, a slightly smaller growth for private media, and just some growth for 
PSM sites where advertising is forbidden.
figure 2 Developments in the average number of unique TPs per site for different types 
of media websites.
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figure 3 Distribution in categories of TPs for Private Media sites (n = 235).
figure 4 Average number of unique TPs in categories for PSM—ads allowed (n = 56).
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figure 5 Distribution in categories of TPs for PSM—ads not observed (n = 11).
figure 6 Distribution in categories of TPs for PSM—ads forbidden (n = 11).
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A Country Perspective
Comparative media analyses often are informed by categorization of coun-
tries belonging to different media systems such as those identified by Hallin 
and Mancini.58 What is more, as legacy media systems to a high degree 
remain national or defined by language, a country-based analysis of our 
data could prove relevant. Figure 8 shows that PSM users in for example, 
Lithuania, Greece, Portugal, or Spain likely have been exposed to more 
TPs than PSM users in for example, North Macedonia, Cyprus, Ukraine, 
or Montenegro. For private media, a very different picture emerges. For 
instance, Figure 9 shows that a media user in Germany meets nine times as 
many unique TPs at private German media sites than at German PSM sites.
The ranked list of countries indicates a pattern that is very different 
from traditional categorization of national media systems. It calls for 
 58. Hallin and Mancini.





































































































































































































































Google PSM ads allowed 
Google PSM ads not seen
Google Private Media
Google PSM ads forbidden
figure 7 Google TPs growth over 20 months for four types of media with trend lines.
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figure 8 Country comparison—Average number of distinct TPs for Private Media sites 
and PSM sites, sorted ascending after PSM sites.
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figure 9 Ratio between average number of TPs for private media and PSM (all visits).
comparison with other dimensions of TPs interactions, for example, the 
different categories of TPs and the distribution between first-party and 
TP HTTP requests and responses. Finally, the list calls for an assessment 
of characteristics of the national media systems other than political (as in 
Hallin and Mancini), such as how technologically advanced individual 
websites are.
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Developments for Individual Media
Taking a detailed look at the development for the individual PSM sites, a 
much more differentiated picture than that in Figure 2 appears. Figures 10 
and 11 compare the first nine visits with the last nine with respect to num-
ber of unique TPs. On the x-axis, we see the change in percentage; on the 
y-axis, the average number of TPs of the first nine visits.
Sites with a decline in TPs typically had many TPs in the pre-GDPR 
visits and many of these sites allow advertising. The biggest decline (80.7 
percent) was observed at the Austrian PSM orf.at. At the other end are 
sites with a growing number of TPs, many of which had relatively few TPs 
before May 25, 2018. However, 23 PSM sites59 show growth of more than 
 59. avrotros.nl, bhrt.ba, rtvslo.si, hessenschau.de, bnnvara.nl, vpro.nl, ruv.is, ndr.de, 
varagids.nl, eo.nl, bnr.bg, polskieradio.pl, lsm.lv, br.de, srf.ch, hr1.de, hr.de, hr3.de, kindernetz.
de, dw.com, tg4.ie, tvm.com.mt, rainews.it.
 
Figure 10 Development for number of TPSs in percent between first nine visits and last 
nine visits, focusing on PSM sites.
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25 percent in unique TPs; 14 of these sites are PSM—ads allowed and the 
remaining nine are PSM—ads forbidden. Interestingly, in 13 of the 23 cases, 
the growth occurs on sites that had a low starting point with, on average, 
fewer than 10 unique TPs in the pre-GDPR visits. The other cases concern 
sites that already had more than average TPs pre-GDPR: The Polish PSM 
polskieradio.pl (22.33 TPs), the Latvian PSM lsm.lv (18.44 TPs), the Malta 
PSM tvm.com.mt (17.44 TPs), and Irish PSM tg4.ie (16.56 TPs).
In Figure 11, we add Private Media to the plot; the average numbers 
of unique TPs as well as the changes in number of unique TPs are more 
dramatic for Private Media. The number of unique TPs pre-GDPR for 
Private Media sites, overall, is at a higher level: 39.3 unique TPs on average 
in the nine pre-GDPR visits. The overall decline for TPs for Private Media 
is small at 3.0 percent. Again, some sites with a low number for TPs pre-
GDPR showed a dramatic growth.
Regardless of media type, private and advertising funded PSM users 
seems to be exposed to many TPs. When we identify the unique TPs for 
 
figure 11 Development for number of TPSs in percent between first nine visits and last 
nine visits, including private media sites.
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the entire sampling period of 20 months, we see that users of private media 
are likely to meet more different TPs than users of other types of media. 
The plots in Figure 12 shows that in some cases, a PSM user will be exposed 
to as many different TPs as when visiting a private media site.
Discussion and Conclusion
General Presence of TP Services
Expanding on a rights-based approach through the notion of priva-
cy-as-trust that captures not just “notice and choice” consent formats but 
also what happens to personal data after a user has given consent, this 
contribution set out to analyze problems relating to PSM institutions’ use 
of TP servers that track, collect, and analyze user behavior. Theoretically, 
we developed a framework that shows that privacy, as one of the com-
munication rights identified by Nieminen,60 should be part and parcel of 
the key values of all legacy media but particularly PSM. As duty-bearers 
and self-identified islands of trust in a media landscape characterized by 
 60. Nieminen.
 
figure 12 Variations in the number of unique TPs for individual media sites, aggregated 
over 20 months.
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datafication and a society driven by surveillance capitalism, PSM institu-
tions have a responsibility toward the rights holder/citizens to deal with 
their personal data in a way that is not only legal but also ethical. Indeed, 
based in Waldman’s notion of privacy-as trust, we argued that PSM need 
to think carefully about their core values to incorporate a strong notion of 
privacy and need to develop policies that respect the rights holders beyond 
mere consent with terms and agreements. Our empirical analysis of data 
reflects the presence of a wide range of TPs on websites of private and 
public service legacy media in Europe, providing much food for thought.
For one, our data confirm that users meet TPs when browsing both 
private and PSM websites, although the number of different TPs they 
come across when visiting different media sites varies. To those unfamiliar 
with technology, the sheer number of TPs found in the sampled (342) 
websites during our 44 visits is staggering, with 3,511 unique TPs. This 
wide-spread presence of TPs on European media’s websites supports and 
expands Lindskow’s61 observation for US media that they are highly inte-
grated in a network of TP services. It confirms Moor’s62 late 1990s imagi-
nary of digital data as “greased information,” seemingly unstoppable and 
beyond the grasp not just of the individual but also of the media. As such, 
our data confirm broad concerns regarding privacy/autonomy—as part of 
the communication rights—of citizens. These concerns are strengthened 
by the fact that privacy-related TPs were present at less than half of all 
sites and that almost one out of three sites had one or more malicious 
TPs. Concerns for the commodification of these data, too, are confirmed 
as advertising-related TPs are the biggest group after the category of yet 
unidentified TPs and the second most present on virtually all sites, after 
TPs concerned with data analytics category. We see the same pattern for 
many European media, including many PSM sites. These data certainly 
confirm that the issue of privacy is part of our media lives more than ever. 
As Waldman63 states: “It is a fact of life so engrained in the social structure 
that we couldn’t live without it” (149).
Second, our sampling period started some months before the enforce-
ment of the GDPR, May 25, 2018. Our collection of TP data were initially 




 64. Van den Bulck and Moe.
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would decline with the GDPR as this regulation requires data handling 
agreements between partners that exchange data, in our case media web-
sites and providers of TP webservices that requires exchange of personal 
data. However, our analysis shows a relatively minor impact of the GDPR 
and mostly for private media. Further research with different data, for 
example, qualitative interviews with experts within the advertising indus-
try, can analyze if the decline for private media TPs can be explained by the 
introduction of the GDPR. Our data suggest, however, that a legal rights 
approach to privacy such as the GDPR, based in agreement to terms and 
conditions, does not ensure fair treatment of users’ personal data once sub-
jected to trade and algorithms and artificial intelligence. However, follow-
ing both Waldman and Zuboff, we do not conclude that privacy is “dead” 
but that it needs to be approached as an issue that starts after consent is 
given.
Indeed, following Zuboff,65 we consider that, once involved in the sur-
veillance economy, media, and their users’ data are being instrumentalized 
as any other resource that freely can be exploited to produce value in the 
surveillance economy. Without any ethical direction or concern about its 
position as game, it is being subjected to the mechanisms of the surveillance 
economy. Certainly, the intense integration with TP servers that emerges 
from our data analysis, suggests that it makes private and PSM institutions 
dependent on TP providers. This is all the more pressing, given that our 
data illustrate that TP services increasing become concentrated in a few 
TP companies, as the top 20 suggests. To give but one example, Google’s 
advertising service doubleclick.net was present at almost all Private Media 
sites, a vast majority of PSM—ads allowed and PSM—no ads seen sites 
and, even, a number of PSM ads forbidden sites. Google Analytics showed 
a similar dominance. Facebook and Twitter, too, prove a dominant pres-
ence across legacy media sites. Consolidation in this regard seems ongoing 
and will make legacy media further dependent on TP companies that fall 
outside of the grasp of national and even EU policymakers. As such, the 
question about who is accountable becomes more pressing: legacy media 
certainly are duty-bearers in this debate but for their economic survival are 
dependent on the giant tech companies like Alphabet. As Wagner66 sug-
gests, though, these big tech companies tend to use the ethical argument 
as a discursive means to deflect legislative interference from governments 
 65. Zuboff, “We Make Them Dance.”
 66. Wagner.
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rather than make genuine ethical efforts, confirmed by recent evidence 
regarding social media giants. Financial repercussions, too, have been 
shown to be ineffective as even hefty multi-million-dollar fines hardly put 
a dent in the profit of these giant companies. This puts the burden of duty 
firmly with legacy media and reinforces the need for an ethical approach 
of privacy-as-trust.
Tough Choices for PSM as Trusted Institutions
The particular position of PSM in the media landscape, their (partly) pub-
lic funding in return for a remit based on societal values and their posi-
tion as “islands of trust” led us to assume that PSM sites would show a 
different picture from private media sites with regards to the presence of 
TPs. From a privacy-as-trust perspective, right holders decide on disclo-
sure of personal data based, at least partly, on contextual norms of trust. 
However, it transpired that presence of TPs did not differ significantly 
between PSM and private media. Rather the dividing criterion appeared 
to be the presence of / permission to run advertising as PSM—ads allowed 
sites showed greater similarities with Private Media sites than with PSM—
no ads allowed or PSM—no ads seen. This dominance, particular in PSM 
that carry advertising, raises several concerns.
For one, all TP companies in the top 20 for PSM—ads allowed sites 
were also in the top 20 for Private Media sites. The larger numbers of TP 
servers at pages with advertising relates to the process of selling advertising 
to advertisers that involves a number of servers, just to find the right bid 
and buyer for the advertisement.67 At the time of writing, this ad sales 
system is being replaced with a system where bidding takes place not in 
the user’s computer, but between the media server and the advertising serv-
ers (so-called “server-side header bidding”).68 Furthermore, the European 
lobby organization for Interactive Advertising, IAB Europe, recently 
announced we are entering the “Post Third-party cookie Era.”69 As a result, 
an observed decline in the number of TPs may not necessarily reflect lower 
exposure of user data but that we cannot measure it any longer. That said, 
the GDPR seems to have led media and advertising technology companies 
 67. Acar et al.
 68. IAB—Interactive Advertising Bureau Europe, Header Bidding and Auction Dynamics.
 69. IAB—Interactive advertising bureau Europe. IAB Europe Guide to the Post Third-Party 
Cookie Era.
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to clean up unused servers and scripts, thereby reducing some of the expo-
sure of user data. However, the general tendency went in the direction 
of slowly increasing the use of TPs to deliver content and analyze user 
behavior.
To the extent that PSM—ads allowed had lower numbers of TPs than 
Private Media, we argue that this does not necessarily reflect better guaran-
tees in protecting the communication rights of users. Indeed, the question 
is whether the actual number of TPs is a clear signifier of privacy expo-
sure or whether the presence of a few key players, for example, large TPs 
such as those of Google and Facebook, already constitute a severe privacy 
exposure. When we use the term “privacy exposure,” we do not consider 
whether the site is GDPR compliant (that has not been our focus in this 
contribution) but the ethical viewpoint that the point of departure for 
the user’s interaction with the PSM offerings in the broadcast was non-
identifiable. For advertising-free, license-fee, or tax financed PSM services, 
obviously one cannot argue that users have to pay for the service with their 
data, as one could argue for private media and social media.
In relationship to our proposition of an ethical approach to privacy 
and data sharing, the situation for TPs at advertising-free PSM websites is 
interesting. Are they there because they do not exchange data, because the 
PSM want to use external services to have a technically more advanced site, 
or because PSM want a level playing field with private media? Or is the 
presence of these TPs just an expression of a lack of internal and external 
policies with regards to the use of TPs?
Privacy-as-Trust, Ethics, and a Rights-Based Approach
Our results illustrate what we consider to be a dilemma for PSM. These 
media organizations clearly are deeply integrated in international networks 
when delivering their webpages, interacting with an extensive network of 
digital business partners that aggregate content, analyze user behavior, sell 
or buy advertisements, integrate social media, or simply deliver files and 
scripts. This helps media organizations to optimize editorial work and (where 
allowed) advertising revenue, and to develop personalized recommendations 
for its users. It allows PSM to stay up to date regarding the newest tech-
nologies, platforms and user interfaces, and to reduce the need to invest in 
technology. The introduction of GDPR affected the number of these TP 
services all in all to a limited extent, suggesting that the introduction of 
such a legal framework does not change the core problem of infringement 
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of media users privacy/autonomy in a context of their data being exchanged 
with TPs and being treated through artificial intelligence and algorithms. 
PSM—and all legacy media—thus find themselves caught up in a dilemma 
between maintaining their integrity or participating in the exposure/surveil-
lance economy, increasingly managed by international companies.
For PSM, this dilemma crucially is about ethics. With a long tradition 
as a trusted institution, users may entrust PSM with their data assuming, 
from Waldman’s70 privacy-as-trust perspective, that “[their] information 
will be used only in accordance with the norms of trust under which it 
was shared in the first place” (149). When rights owners repeatedly experi-
ence or perceive the duty-bearers to violate that trust, the duty-bearer, that 
is, PSM, may ultimately lose their position as trusted institution. In that 
regard, they stand much to lose. This raises important questions for PSM 
and its policymakers: Can PSM organizations use the same tools as private 
media and as freely as private media to monitor and optimize attention—
tools that operate in the background without the knowledge of the user? 
Some arguments in favor include the need for PSM to be competitive with 
commercial media, to maintain relevance for users and to produce value 
for license-free/public funding. However, as trusted institutions, PSM 
organizations have an ethical obligation to be trustworthy, that is, honest 
and transparent in their mode of operation. If nothing else, opaque use of 
TP servers undermines their very role as “islands of trust,” an important 
legitimation of their funding and existence.
Final Thoughts
Our results suggest that differences between countries do not fit traditional 
distinctions between national media systems such as those based on polit-
ical characteristics (as in Hallin and Mancini). It certainly invites us to 
think about other factors to take into consideration when trying to under-
stand differences between media systems, such as technological advance-
ment. The lack of path dependency in this regard, though, raises questions 
about how policymakers can have an impact on this beyond legislative 
instruments. Thinking about TPs from a communication rights approach, 
focuses on how policymakers can help ensure that the duty-bearers, that is, 
the digital media can be made to respect the communication rights of the 
rights holders, that is, the digital media users.
 70. Waldman.
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Our data are rich and detailed in many aspects. Further and more advanced 
exploration of the large dataset may reveal more detailed and new patterns 
compared to the overall findings presented here. Particularly TPs patterns 
at the level of individual media sites may provide further insights into how 
media can behave both legally and ethically with regards to communication 
rights of privacy and information autonomy within a digital media market 
that necessitates the use of TPs. For instance, a previous study71 suggests that 
there are some PSM institutions that minimize the involvement of TP serv-
ers at a very low level. More in-depth analysis of such cases potentially can 
show how higher ethical standards can be maintained without losing the 
advantages of advanced technological, user friendly design of sites, righting 
the balance between communication right holders and legacy media, espe-
cially PSM, ensuring their continued relevance as trusted institutions.
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